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Abstract 
In May 2013, Federal Reserve officials first began to talk of the possibility of tapering 
their security purchases. This tapering talk had a sharp negative impact on emerging markets.  
Different countries, however, were affected very differently.  We use data for exchange rates, 
foreign reserves and equity prices between April and August 2013 to analyze who was hit and 
why.  We find that emerging markets that allowed the real exchange rate to appreciate and the 
current account deficit to widen during the prior period of quantitative easing saw the sharpest 
impact. Better fundamentals (the budget deficit, the public debt, the level of reserves, or the rate 
of economic growth) did not provide insulation.  A more important determinant of the 
differential impact was the size of the country’s financial market: countries with larger markets 
experienced more pressure on the exchange rate, foreign reserves and equity prices.  We interpret 
this as investors being able to better rebalance their portfolios when the target country has a 
relatively large and liquid financial market.   
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1. Introduction 
 
 In May 2013, officials of the Federal Reserve System first began to talk of the possibility 
of the U.S. central bank tapering its securities purchases (gradually reducing them from the 
prevailing $85 billion monthly rate to something lower, presumably as a prelude to phasing them 
out entirely).  A milestone to which many observers point is May 22, 2013 when Chairman 
Bernanke raised the possibility of tapering in his testimony to the Congress.  This “tapering talk” 
had a sharp negative impact on economic and financial conditions in emerging markets.   
Three aspects of that impact are noteworthy.  First, not only was the impact sharp but, in 
the view of many commentators, it was surprisingly large. The most alarmed (some would say 
alarmist) commentators raised the possibility that some emerging countries might be heading 
towards a full blown crisis like that in Mexico in 1994 and Asia in 1998. Second, the impact was 
not felt uniformly; different countries were affected rather differently. Third, there were 
complaints from policy makers in the developing world about the Fed’s turn to tapering that 
were seemingly hard to square with earlier criticisms of quantitative easing by the U.S. central 
bank as a form of “currency war.”   
 This paper is a first attempt to shed light on these issues. We use data for a cross section 
of emerging markets to analyze who was hit by the Fed’s tapering talk and why. We focus on the 
change in exchange rates, foreign reserves and equity prices between April 2013, just prior to 
talk of tapering, and August 2013, by which time the response was largely complete (in 
September, new data on the condition of the U.S. economy led Federal Reserve officials to make 
statements that moderated prior expectations of tapering).  We relate the reaction of these 
variables to several classes of potential determinants: (a) observable macroeconomic 
fundamentals like the budget deficit, public debt, foreign reserves and GDP growth rate in the 
prior period; (b) the size and openness of a country’s financial markets; and (c) the extent to 
which capital-flow-sensitive indicators like the real exchange rate and current account balance 
had been allowed to move in the prior period when quantitative easing was underway, there had 
been no expectations of tapering, and policy makers in emerging markets had complained of 
currency wars.  
 On the basis of this analysis we analyze who was hit and why. Our answers are as 
follows.  First, there is little evidence that countries with stronger macroeconomic fundamentals 
(smaller budget deficits, lower debts, more reserves and stronger growth rates in the immediately 
prior period) were rewarded with smaller falls in exchange rates, foreign reserves and stock 
prices starting in May.  What mattered more was the size of their financial markets; investors 
seeking to rebalance their portfolios concentrated on emerging markets with relatively large and 
liquid financial systems, these were the markets where they could most easily sell without 
incurring losses and where there was the most scope for portfolio rebalancing.  The obvious 
contrast is with so-called frontier markets with smaller and less liquid financial systems.  This is 
a reminder that success at growing the financial sector can be a mixed blessing.  Among other 
things, it can accentuate the impact on an economy of financial shocks emanating from outside. 
 In addition, we find that the largest impact of tapering was felt by countries that allowed 
exchange rates to run up most dramatically in the earlier period of expectations of continued 
easing on the part of the Federal Reserve, when large amounts of capital were flowing into 
emerging markets.  Similarly, we find a large impact in countries that allowed the current 
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account deficit to widen most dramatically in the earlier period when it was easily financed.  
Countries that used policy and in some cases, perhaps, enjoyed good luck that allowed them to 
limit the rise in the real exchange rate and the growth of the current account deficit in the boom 
period suffered the smallest reversals.  This provides some intuition for how it was that the same 
countries could complain about quantitative easing while it was underway – QE had large, 
disconcerting impacts on local markets – and then also complain about tapering talk. Talk of 
tapering had a relatively large negative impact on those local markets that earlier allowed their 
asset prices to run up sharply and their current accounts to widen relatively dramatically.  
We interpret these real exchange rate and current account measures as picking up the 
impact, positive, negative or neutral, of macroprudential policy broadly defined.  Recall that we 
control for the stance of fiscal policy (since fiscal tightening can also limit the appreciation of 
asset prices in a period when capital is flowing in).  In addition, we control for the intensity of 
capital controls in the prior period. These, similarly, do not appear to have exerted a consistently 
significant impact on the effects of tapering.  Nor does their inclusion alter the estimated effect 
of the change in the real exchange rate.  Evidently, neither capital controls, nor fiscal tightening, 
nor even a combination of the two, sufficed to damp down the effects of financial inflows.  
Instead, a broader array of macroprudential policies – limits on the rate of growth of bank 
lending, loan-to-value regulation for the mortgage market, and similar measures – may have 
made a difference by moderating either the upward pressure on the exchange rate or the 
widening of the current account deficit, and may therefore be called for in the future. 
2. Data 
In what follows we consider the impact of tapering on exchange rates, foreign reserves 
and stock prices, but we also calculate composite indices of overall capital market pressure.  
These indices are constructed as a weighted average of changes in exchange rates, reserves and 
stock market yields. These indices are constructed in a manner analogous to the exchange market 
pressure index of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), which is a weighted average of 
changes in exchange rates, reserves, and policy interest rates, where the weights were the 
inverses of the standard deviation of each series. We first create this index using data for 
exchange rate and reserve losses, and then add the negative of the changes in stock yields 
(denoting the two versions Index 1 and Index 2, respectively).
2
 For the weights, we calculate the 
standard deviations for each series using monthly data from January 2000 to August 2013. The 
weights are then the inverses of the standard deviations (see Appendix B).  
Most of the data definitions and sources will be familiar.  We calculate changes in the 
real exchange rate using data for the nominal exchange rate with respect to the US dollar and the 
consumer price index for the subject country and the United States.  Alternatively, we use data 
for real effective exchange rates from the Global Economic Monitor database of the World Bank 
and the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund, although the latter 
covers far fewer countries. It turns out that exchange rate data constructed using different sources 
are highly correlated and in practice make little difference for our results.  We therefore report 
the results using the data for bilateral real exchange rate in the regressions reported here. We 
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 We also did the same including changes in sovereign bonds yields and credit default swaps spreads, but these are 
available for far fewer countries (not all the countries in the sample having well-functioning government bond 
markets). 
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calculate the percent change in real exchange rates between 2009 and 2012 in two ways.  We 
first take the percent cumulative change over the period from 2009 to 2012 and, as an alternative, 
the average of annual percent changes for 2012, 2011 and 2010. Since the two methods produce 
very similar series, we report only those for the latter.   
Financial market size is measured by total external private financing—i.e. inflows of 
equity, bonds and loans (these are data for 2010-2012 from the IMF Global Financial Stability 
Report, transformed into logarithms).  Alternatively, we measure financial market size as the 
portfolio liability stock from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2012), as stock market capitalization, and 
as aggregate GDP. Reassuringly, use of these alternatives had little material impact on the 
results, since most of the alternative measures are fairly highly correlated. Similarly, there are 
several common measures of reserve adequacy: reserves in months of imports, reserves as 
proportion of M2, reserves as a share of GDP, reserves relative to total external debt and reserves 
relative to short term debt. Below we report results for the ratio of reserves to M2.  Results using 
other measures are similar. 
Table 1: Effect on Measures of Market Conditions in BRICS countries, Indonesia and 
Turkey, April-July, 2013 
 % Change 
in Nominal 
Exchange 
Rate  
% 
Change 
in Stock 
Indices 
% 
Change 
in 
External 
Reserves 
Basis 
Points 
Change 
in Bond 
Yields 
Basis 
Points 
Change 
in CDS 
Capital 
Market 
Pressure 
Index I 
Capital 
Market 
Pressure 
Index II 
Brazil 12.52 -8.92 -1.69 55.78 64.06 3.46 5.00 
Russia 4.63 0.42 -3.32 24.95 35.95 2.74 2.69 
India 9.98 4.04 -4.77 n.a. n.a. 7.15 6.57 
Indonesia 3.58 -10.01 -13.61 64.75 64.06 5.06 6.47 
China -0.85 -6.49 0.38 23.54 51.78 -2.71 -1.80 
South Africa 8.96 3.07 -5.42 57.68 48.17 3.98 3.26 
Turkey 7.61 -12.16 -8.20 40.85 66.97 3.26 4.63 
Note: An increase in nominal exchange rate is depreciation; increase in capital market pressure indices I and II 
imply a larger nominal depreciation or reserve loss; and a larger nominal depreciation, reserve loss, or decline in 
stock market index, respectively.  
 Table 1 offers an overview of the behavior of these measures of market conditions in the 
summer of 2013, displaying their values for the BRICS countries, and Indonesia and Turkey, 
well known cases on which much commentary focused.  We see that with the exception of China 
their exchange rates all depreciated (China of course being known for its policy of seeking to 
stabilize its currency against the dollar).  Similarly, reserves fell in six of seven cases (again 
China being an exception).  But equity prices fell in just 4 of 7 cases (including in China), in a 
first hint of the heterogeneity we document below.  Our composite indices show a negative 
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impact of tapering on financial conditions overall in the six other countries but not China (where, 
however, it should be noted that the stock market did decline).
3
 
3. Overview 
We now proceed to analyzing the entire class of emerging markets.  We start with the 
same set of countries as in Ghosh et al (2013), to which we add Ghana, Hong Kong, Kenya, 
Ireland, Singapore, and Tanzania. This gives us the universe of countries included in the various 
definitions of emerging markets.  We drop Eurozone countries (Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, Slovakia and Spain), since they have no meaningful national exchange rate, as well as 
countries that use US dollar as their currency (Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama). We also drop 
Egypt because it experienced shocks independent of retrenchment.  This gives us 53 countries. 
Some emerging markets started experiencing effects immediately after the Fed 
Chairman’s testimony on May 22, and those effects persisted through much of the summer. We 
therefore calculate cumulative changes in the variables of interest between the end of April and, 
alternatively, the end of June, the end of July and the end of August.  
Table 2 shows that 36 out of 53 countries experienced some exchange rate depreciation 
between the end of April and the end of June.
4
 Even as some of these exchange rates recovered 
by the end of August, exchange rates for almost 60 per cent of the countries remained below the 
levels at the end of April. The average rate of depreciation was over 6 percent, and exchange 
rates for half of the countries had depreciated by more than 5½ percent.  
Panel A of Figure 1 provides additional details on the distribution of exchange rate 
changes across countries between the end of April and end of July. The largest changes were in 
Brazil, India, Paraguay, South Africa, and Uruguay.  Note that three of the BRICS countries are 
included in this list.  All of these countries experienced exchange rate depreciations of 9 percent 
or greater during this period, with Brazil having the largest depreciation at 12.5 percent.  
Reserves declined for 29 countries between April and July, 2013, as shown in Panel B. 
The countries with the largest declines were the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, and Ukraine.
5
  In some countries the pace of decline accelerated considerably in August. 
Stock markets declined on average as well. We have data for fewer countries for stock 
market indices (the indices are in nominal local currency, with the exception of Israel, which had 
data indexed in nominal USD).  25 of the 38 countries for which we have the data experienced 
some decline in their stock markets. The cumulative decline between April and August averaged 
at 6.9 percent, and the median decline was 6.2 percent, as shown in Panel C of Table 2. Panel C 
of Figure 1 shows the distribution of the effect on stock markets across countries, between the 
end of April and end of July. The effect on stock markets is much more heterogeneous than on 
exchange rates. Fully 40 percent of the countries either did not experience a stock market 
                                                          
3
 In addition, bond spreads widened and credit default swap spreads widened in all six cases for which they are 
available.  Note the preceding footnote. 
4
 We extracted the data from Global Economic Monitoring database of the World Bank, on October 29, 2013. Data 
form other sources, including Bloomberg, was extracted in the same week.  
5
 Egypt’s foreign reserves rose by 33 percent between the end of April and the end of July. Since this clearly 
reflected domestic political shocks, we drop it from the sample when proceeding to regression analysis. 
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decline.  For seven emerging markets (Chile, the Czech Republic, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Peru, 
Serbia, and Turkey), however, the decline was more than 10 percent. The stock market index for 
Peru declined by over 24 percent, a value that was 10 percentage points greater than the country 
with the second greatest decline, Serbia.
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Table 2: Cumulative Percentage Changes in Capital Market Conditions 
A. Exchange Rates  
 April-June April-July April-August 
Fraction of Countries in which 
Exchange Rate Depreciated 
36/53 35/53 30/53 
(average for countries which experienced an exchange rate depreciation) 
Mean Depreciation (%) 3.14 4.26 6.21 
Median Depreciation (%) 1.90 3.84 5.62 
B. Cumulative Percent changes in Foreign Reserves  
 April-June April-July April-August 
Fraction of Countries in which 
Reserves Declined 
36/52 29/51 29/51 
(average for countries which experienced a decline in reserves) 
Mean Decline (%) -2.98 -5.15 -6.21 
Median Decline (%) -2.12 -3.18 -4.55 
C: Cumulative Percentage Change in Stock Market Index 
 April-June April-July April-August 
Fraction of Countries in which 
Stock Market Index Declined 
25/38 23/38 25/38 
(average for countries which experienced a decline in stock market index) 
Mean Decline (%) -6.21 -7.56 -6.94 
Median Decline (%) -5.42 -6.37 -6.21 
D: Cumulative Increase in Sovereign Bond Spreads  
 April-June April-July April-August 
Fraction of Countries in which  
Bond Spreads Increased 
24/31 23/31 23/31 
(average for countries which experienced an increase in bond spreads) 
Mean increase (basis points) 54.31 48.52 61.39 
Median increase (basis points) 44.95 37.57 58.0 
Note: In the table above and throughout in the paper, an increase in nominal exchange rate is a deprecation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 The country with a large increase in stock prices was Pakistan where developments were driven by other events: 
Pakistan agreed to a $5.3 billion loan from the IMF on July 5, boosting reserves and leading to rallies in stocks, 
bonds and the rupee (Bloomberg, July 5, 2013). 
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Figure 1:  Effect on Exchange Rate, Reserves, Stock prices and Bond Spreads during April-
July, 2013 
A: Cumulative Effect on Exchange Rate 
during April-July, 2013 , % change 
 
B: Cumulative Effect on External 
Reserves during April-July, 2013, % 
change 
 
  
C: Cumulative Effect on Stock Market Index 
between April-July, 2013, % percent change 
 
D: Cumulative Effect on Sovereign Bond 
Spreads during April-July, 2013, in basis 
points 
 
  
 
Data on sovereign bond spreads are available for fewer countries, but almost three-
quarters of countries for which there are data experienced an increase in spreads, the mean effect 
being about 50 basis points (Panel D of Figure 1).  The countries with the largest increase in 
bond spreads were Ghana, Indonesia, Morocco, Ukraine and Venezuela, with the latter two 
countries experiencing increases in spreads of over 150 basis points.
7
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 The two countries for which spreads fell are Pakistan (198 basis points – on its case see above) and Argentina (82 
basis points).  Data on credit default swaps (CDS) are available for only half as many countries as the ones for 
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  Table 3 shows the bivariate correlations and corresponding p values of significance. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the effects are not highly correlated, with one notable exception in the 
relationship between stock prices and bond spreads. Again, the message appears to be that 
different emerging markets were affected in rather different ways.   
Table 3: Correlation Coefficients across Cumulative Changes in Variables in April-August, 
2013 
 Exchange 
Depreciation 
Decline in 
Reserves, 
% 
Decline in 
Stock Prices 
% 
 
Exchange Depreciation 1    
     
Decline in Reserves, % 0.20 1   
 (0.17)    
Decline in Stock Prices % 0.05 0.23 1  
 (0.75) (0.17)   
Increase in Bond Spreads 0.05 -0.24 0.57***  
 (0.78) (0.20) (0.00)  
Note: values in the table are bivariate correlation coefficients; values in parentheses are the p values for the null 
hypotheses that the coefficients are equal to zero.  
Finally, we consider the composite indices described above, first constructing the index 
as just the weighted averages of changes in exchange rates and reserves and then constructing 
another index combining these two variables with the percentage stock market decline.
8
  
 
As the left hand panel of Figure 2 shows, the majority of countries (35 of 51) for which 
data are available for both exchange rate and reserves experienced pressure in at least one of 
these series. The countries experiencing the largest impact were India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru 
and Thailand.  India and Peru were the outliers, with values of 7.2 and 6.4, respectively.  Panel B 
shows that the effect was stronger when we take into account stock index declines as well, and 
that intensity increased progressively from June through August. Again the majority of countries 
(30 of 37) for which data are available experienced pressure on exchange rate, stock market, 
and/or reserves. The countries experiencing the largest impacts were Peru, India, Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Chile.  See Table 4 for further details. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
which we have the data for exchange rates.  For what it is worth, CDS spreads increased for almost all the countries 
for which the data are available during this period. The cumulative average increase was more than 50 basis points 
between the end of April and end of July.  Eight countries experienced an increase of more than 40 basis points and 
three countries experienced an increase of more than 200 basis points. These three countries were Argentina, 
Ukraine, and Venezuela.  These countries were perhaps affected due to other unrelated ongoing political and 
economic issues. 
8
 The number of countries for which we are able to construct these indices declines from 51 for the first to 37 for the 
second. If we also include increases in bond yields in the index the number of countries for which we would be able 
to generate an index declines to 25. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Market Pressure Indices I and II  
 
A: Weighted average of exchange rate 
depreciation and decline in reserves, April-
July, 2013 
B: Weighted average of exchange rate 
depreciation, decline in stock index, and 
decline in reserves, April-July, 2013 
  
 
Table 4: Market Pressure Indices 
 
 April-June April-July April-August 
Market Pressure Index I: weighted changes in exchange rate and reserves 
Mean 1.07 1.37 1.61 
Median 0.67 0.91 1.17 
Number of Countries  
With positive values of Index I 
36/51 35/51 31/51 
Mean for Countries with Positive Values 1.88 2.48 3.56 
Median for Countries with Positive Values 1.37 1.96 2.87 
Market Pressure Index II: weighted changes in exchange rate, reserves and stock prices 
Mean 1.77 2.20 2.50 
Median 1.49 1.87 2.22 
Number of Countries  
With positive values of Index II 
28/37 30/37 26/37 
Mean for Countries with Positive Values 2.74 3.01 4.18 
Median for Countries with Positive Values 2.41 2.64 3.14 
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4.  Regression Analysis 
We now regress three variables (i) exchange rate depreciation, (ii) the composite index 
based on exchange rate depreciation and reserves losses (Index I), and (iii) the composite index 
based on exchange rate depreciation, reserve losses and the decline in stock prices (Index II) on 
measures of macroeconomic conditions and policy, financial market structure, and asset market 
conditions.  Specifically, we estimate linear regression equations of the form:  
Yi = αk Xk,i +εi                                  (1) 
where Yi , the dependent variable, is either exchange rate depreciation, Index I or Index II for 
country i between the end of April and the end of August 2013.  Note that the number of 
countries varies, since observations for stock markets are available for fewer countries than 
observations for exchange rates and foreign reserves. 
The right hand side variables are denoted by Xk. Explanatory variables in equation (1) 
include GDP growth, the budget deficit, inflation, and the level of foreign reserves as measures 
of the economic fundamentals; the deterioration in current account deficit and real exchange rate 
appreciation as measures of local market impacts and loss in competitiveness; cumulative private 
capital inflows, the stock of portfolio liabilities, stock market capitalization and aggregate GDP 
as alternative measures of the size of the market; the exchange rate regime, public debt, capital 
account openness, the quality of the business environment (or institutional quality) as structural 
variables. Where results are similar using different proxies, we report only a representative 
subset.
9
  We take the values of these variables in 2012 or their averages over the period 2010–
2012 (either way, prior to the advent of tapering talk). Since most of these variables are 
persistent and thus highly correlated across years, it turns out to be inconsequential whether we 
use the data for just one year or the period averages. 
Since many of the explanatory variables are also correlated with one other, we include 
them parsimoniously in the regressions. From each category of variables we generally include 
only one variable at a time, while conducting robustness checks to make sure that the results are 
comparable when alternative measures are included in the regressions.  
Table 5 reports our first set of regressions. There we estimate specifications with the size 
of the financial market in emerging markets, the stock of reserves, increase in current account 
deficit, and percent change in real exchange rate (details are in Appendix B).  The results 
indicate that the deterioration in the current account and the extent of real exchange rate 
appreciation in the 2010–2012 period are associated with larger exchange rate depreciations (and 
of the composite indices) in the summer of 2013.  This helps us understand how the same 
countries that complained about the cross-border impact of quantitative easing in the earlier 
period could also complain about talk of tapering in the summer of 2013.  The same countries 
most affected by (or least able to limit) the earlier impact on their real exchange rates were the 
same ones to subsequently experience large and sometimes uncomfortable real exchange rate 
reversals. 
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 Results hold broadly if we calculate the changes in exchange rate, reserves, or stock prices for April-July, 2013 
period. Additional results are available from the authors on request.  
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In addition, countries with larger financial markets, measured here by the magnitude of 
external financing, experienced larger exchange rate depreciation and reserve losses.  As 
mentioned above, this may indicate that it was easier to rebalance portfolios by withdrawing 
from a few larger markets than to rebalance portfolios by selling assets in smaller markets.  It 
suggests that having a large financial market that is attractive to foreign investors may be 
somewhat of a mixed blessing under these circumstances. Note, as mentioned above, that we 
consider several different measures of the size of the market, the portfolio liability stock from 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, stock market capitalization, aggregate GDP, etc. These are correlated 
with each other and give similar results in the regressions (see Appendix C). These results imply 
that the larger markets are more prone to the effects of liquidity retrenchment. In contrast, the 
stock of reserves held in the previous period does not appear to be associated with the effect on 
exchange rate or on the composite indices of exchange rate and reserves.  
Table 5: Factors Associated With Exchange Rate Depreciation and Market Pressure 
Indices, April-August 2013 
Dependent Variable 
% 
change in 
Nominal 
Exchange 
rate  
Index I: 
Exchange 
rate, 
Reserves 
Index II: 
Exchange 
rate, 
Reserves, 
Stock 
Prices 
% 
change in 
Nominal 
Exchange 
rate  
Index I: 
Exchange 
rate, 
Reserves 
Index II: 
Exchange 
rate, 
Reserves, 
Stock 
Prices 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Increase in Current Account 
Deficit in 2010–12, over 2007–09 0.25** 0.17* 0.33*** 0.21** 0.07 0.23** 
 
[2.58] [1.77] [3.27] [2.18] [0.74] [2.45] 
Avg. Annual % Change  
in RER, 2010–2012    -0.37*** -0.35*** -0.54*** 
    [2.82] [3.21] [3.66] 
Size (Private External Financing, 
 2010–12, Log) 1.42*** 0.71** 0.58 1.20*** 0.55** 0.23 
 
[3.85] [2.65] [1.19] [3.16] [2.15] [0.41] 
Reserves/M2 Ratio, 2012  -2.53 1.52 4.32 -1.15 1.45 4.88 
 
[0.73] [0.46] [1.03] [0.40] [0.51] [1.43] 
      
Observations 45 43 32 43 41 30 
R-squared 0.43 0.24 0.29 0.49 0.36 0.43 
Adj. R-squared 0.39 0.19 0.21 0.44 0.29 0.34 
Note: An increase in real exchange rate (RER) is depreciation; we take average annual percent change in RER 
during 2010, 2011 and 2012. Current account deficit (CAD) is current deficit as percent of GDP; we take average 
annual increase in CAD during 2010–12 over 2007–09. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. *** indicates the 
coefficients are significant at 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, and * significance at 10 percent 
level.  
In Table 6 we include the additional explanatory variables, focusing first on the extent of 
exchange rate depreciation as the dependent variable. We consider economic growth, the fiscal 
deficit, public debt relative to GDP and inflation as indicators of aggregate economic policy and 
12 
 
performance.
10
 We also include exchange rate regime categorization and an index for controls on 
capital account, both of which come from data with the IMF Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).   
 
Table 6: Factors Associated with Exchange Rate Depreciation, April-August 2013 
(including other macro variables) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Percent change in Nominal Exchange Rate between April-August, 2013 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Increase in Current Account Deficit, 
2010-12 over 2007–09 0.20** 0.21** 0.20* 0.19* 0.20** 0.16 0.13 0.22** 
 
[2.19] [2.05] [1.98] [1.95] [2.07] [1.55] [1.13] [2.31] 
Avg. Annual % Change  
in RER, 2010-2012 -0.35** -.39*** -.42** -.49*** -.38*** -.38*** -.29** -.37*** 
 [2.30] [2.84] [2.66] [3.37] [2.79] [2.96] [2.27] [2.76] 
Size (External Financing, 2010–12, 
Log) 1.2*** 1.3*** 1.2*** 1.1** 1.2*** 1.1*** .96** 1.2*** 
 
[3.07] [3.28] [3.13] [2.71] [3.08] [3.20] [2.31] [3.10] 
Reserves/M2 Ratio, 2012  -1.17 -0.36 0.10 -0.64 -0.58 -1.92 -3.61 -1.22 
 
[0.41] [0.13] [0.03] [0.23] [0.21] [0.60] [1.20] [0.42] 
Real GDP Growth , 2012 0.08 
     
 
 
 
[0.30] 
     
 
 General Public Debt, 2012 
 
0.02 
    
 
 
  
[0.82] 
    
 
 Fiscal Deficit 2012, % of GDP 
  
0.13 
   
 
 
   
[0.67] 
   
 
 Inflation, 2012 
   
0.10** 
  
 
 
    
[2.10] 
  
 
 Capital Control Index, 2012 
    
0.01 
 
 
 
     
[0.49] 
 
 
 Increase in Capital Controls Index, 
2010–12      0.19*   
      [1.82]   
Exchange Rate Regime, 2012 
      
.61*** 
 
       
[2.72] 
 World Governance Indicator, 2012 
      
 0.22 
       
 [0.22] 
Observations 43 42 43 43 43 43 42 43 
R-squared 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.49 0.54 .58 0.49 
Adj. R-squared 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.48 .52 0.43 
Note: An increase in real exchange rate (RER) is depreciation; we take average annual percent change in RER 
during 2010, 2011 and 2012. Current account deficit (CAD) is current deficit as percent of GDP; we take average 
annual increase in CAD during 2010–12 over 2007–09. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. *** indicates the 
coefficients are significant at 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, and * significance at 10 percent 
level.  
We also calculate changes in controls on capital flows between 2010 and 2012. For the 
business environment or institutional quality, we include “Doing Business” ranking of the 
                                                          
10
 We also calculated change in inflation rate in 2010–2012 over 2007–2009, but it is not significant in the 
regressions. For GDP growth we also consider values in 2013 Q1, or growth forecast for 2013. 
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countries and the Worldwide Governance Indicator for 2012, reporting results from the latter in 
the table below.
11
  
 
The estimates do not provide much support for the notion that the standard measures of 
economic policy and performance were strongly associated with the extent of tapering.  GDP 
growth, the budget deficit, public debt, level of reserves and the governance indicator do not 
exert a significant impact on the exchange.  In contrast, financial market size, the increase in 
current account deficit and the extent of real exchange rate appreciation are still associated with 
the subsequent exchange rate impact.    
Some additional results are worth mentioning.  The one “macroeconomic fundamental” 
that shows up as significant in Table 6 is the inflation rate in the prior period.  Inflation is, of 
course, one mechanism through which a country can experience real appreciation.  So this 
coefficient may be picking up the same financial-market effects that we identified before.
12
 That 
the indicator for the exchange rate regime enters negatively and significantly here is not 
surprising.  It simply tells us that countries that pegged their currencies suffered less depreciation 
in the summer of 2013.  More interesting will be whether they also saw less (or more) movement 
in their reserves and equity prices. Finally, there is some sign that countries which tightened their 
capital controls in the prior period experienced more currency depreciation when talk turned to 
tapering.  It may be that these were the countries with the greatest perceived vulnerability (where 
policy makers responded by tightening controls – the change in controls was partly endogenous, 
in other words) and that perceived vulnerability translated into actual vulnerability.  But if so, 
there is no sign that controls had a moderating effect starting in May.
13
 Table 7 reinforces the 
conclusion that controls alone were ineffectual as a macroprudential device. There, where the 
dependent variable is weighted average of the change in the exchange rate and change in 
reserves, the capital control measures lose their significance.  
Note also that the exchange rate regime has no separate significant impact on the change 
in reserves (although it does continue to register significantly in Table 7) and no significant 
impact on the change in the equity price index. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 We also estimated the standardized coefficients to compare the coefficients of various variables quantitatively. 
These show that the coefficient of the size of financial markets is the largest followed by the coefficients of real 
exchange rate and current account deficit.  
12
 Note however that the real exchange rate remains significant in the equation where inflation is included, so this 
cannot be all that occurring. 
13
 It also could be that our measure of controls is imperfect – that we are not picking up further changes in their 
incidence and extent in the first four months of 2013, since we use 2010–12 data. 
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Table 7: Factors Associated with Market Pressure Index I (consisting of Exchange Rate 
Depreciation and Reserve Loss) 
 Dependent Variable: Composite Index of Percent Change in Nominal Exchange Rate and Reserve 
Loss between April-August, 2013 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Increase in Current Account  
Deficit 2010–12, over 2007–09 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.05 
 
[0.65] [0.69] [0.52] [0.50] [0.34] [0.56] [0.22] [0.43] 
Avg. Annual % Change  
in RER, 2010–2012 -.34*** -.37*** -.45*** -.46*** -.39*** -.36*** 
-
.35*** -.36*** 
 [2.98] [3.22] [3.01] [3.57] [3.34] [3.19] [3.03] [3.39] 
Size (External Financing, 2010–
12, Log) 0.56** 0.61** 0.58** 0.47* 0.42* 0.54* 0.36 0.57** 
 
[2.08] [2.43] [2.30] [1.77] [1.96] [1.99] [1.09] [2.20] 
Reserves/M2 Ratio, 2012  1.41 2.27 3.96 1.74 2.74 1.28 0.71 1.53 
 
[0.49] [0.81] [1.47] [0.66] [1.01] [0.43] [0.25] [0.55] 
Real GDP Growth, 2012 0.05 
     
 
 
 
[0.28] 
     
 
 General Public Debt, 2012 
 
0.02 
    
 
 
  
[1.14] 
    
 
 Fiscal Deficit 2012, % of GDP 
  
0.24* 
   
 
 
   
[1.69] 
   
 
 Inflation, 2012 
   
0.08* 
  
 
 
    
[1.88] 
  
 
 Capital Control Index, 2012 
    
0.03 
 
 
 
     
[1.53] 
 
 
 Increase in Capital Controls, 
2009-12      0.03   
      [0.51]   
Exchange Rate Regime, 2012 
      
0.38* 
 
       
[1.93] 
 World Governance Indicator, 
2012 
      
 -0.62 
       
 [0.80] 
Observations 41 40 41 41 41 41 40 41 
R-squared 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.42 0.37 
Adj. R-squared 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.33 0.28 
Note: An increase in real exchange rate (RER) is depreciation; we take average annual percent change in RER 
during 2010, 2011 and 2012. Current account deficit (CAD) is current deficit as percent of GDP; we take average 
annual increase in CAD during 2010–12 over 2007–09. Robust t statistics are in parentheses. *** indicates the 
coefficients are significant at 1 percent level, ** indicates significance at 5 percent, and * significance at 10 percent 
level.  
5. Conclusion 
Our exploration of the effects of the Fed’s tapering talk in the summer of 2013 yields the 
following conclusions.  First, emerging markets that allowed the largest appreciation of their real 
exchange rates and the largest increase in their current account deficits in the prior period of 
quantitative easing saw the sharpest currency depreciation, reserve losses and stock market 
declines when talk turned to tapering.  Second, measures of policy fundamentals and economic 
performance (the budget deficit, the public debt, the level of reserves, and the rate of GDP 
15 
 
growth) do not indicate that better fundamentals provided better insulation.  An important 
determinant of that differential impact, in addition to the prior run-up of the real exchange rate 
and current account deficit, was the size of a country’s financial market: countries with larger 
markets experienced more pressure on the exchange rate, reserves and stock market when talk 
turned to tapering.  We interpret this as investors seeking to rebalance their portfolios being able 
to do so more easily and conveniently when the target country has a relatively large and liquid 
market.  This suggests that having a large and liquid market can be a mixed blessing when a 
country is subject to financial shocks coming from beyond its borders. 
Finally, there is little evidence that the presence of controls or their tightening in the prior 
period provided insulation from talk of tapering.  More important, we suspect, were 
macroprudential policies broadly defined, where these were used to limit the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate and widening of the current account deficit in response to foreign capital 
inflows. These patterns thus point to which countries are and are not vulnerable to external 
pressures once tapering again comes around. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Countries in the sample and data availability
14
 
East Asia and Pacific Europe and Central Asia Latin America and Caribbean 
China CHN Albania ALB Argentina ARG 
Hong Kong SAR HKG Armenia ARM Brazil BRA 
Indonesia IDN Azerbaijan AZE Chile CHL 
Malaysia MYS Belarus BGR Colombia COL 
Philippines PHL Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH Costa Rica CRI 
Singapore SGP Bulgaria BLR Dominican Republic DOM 
South Korea KOR Croatia HRV Guatemala GTM 
Thailand THA Czech Republic CZE Jamaica JAM 
Vietnam VNM Hungary HUN Mexico MEX 
Middle East and North Africa Kazakhstan KAZ Paraguay PRY 
Israel ISR Latvia LVA Peru PER 
Jordan JOR Lithuania LTU Uruguay URY 
Lebanon LBN Macedonia, FYR MKD Venezuela VEN 
Morocco MAR Poland POL Sub-Saharan Africa 
Tunisia TUN Romania ROU Ghana GHA 
South Asia Russia RUS Kenya KEN 
India IND Serbia SRB Mauritius MUS 
Pakistan PAL Turkey TUR South Africa ZAF 
Sri Lanka LKA Ukraine UKR   
 
  
                                                          
14
 Countries excluded in our sample—Eurozone nations: Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia and 
Spain; Nations which use the US dollar as their currency: Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama; we also drop Egypt 
because it experienced shocks independent of retrenchment. 
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Appendix B:  
Variable Description 
Percent Change in Nominal 
Exchange Rate 
Percent change in official exchange rate over the period indicated in the 
text. Data expressed as local currency per USD. Original data are 
recorded as monthly averages.  Source: World Bank GEM database.  
Percent Change in Stock 
Market Indices 
 
Percent change in stock price index over the period indicated in the text. 
Original data are indices of local currency, with the index = 100 in the 
year 2000.  Exceptions: Kazakhstan and Morocco have data indexed to 
the year 2010 in local currency, Israel has data indexed to the year 2000 
in USD, and Hong Kong and Serbia have data indexed to the year 2005 in 
local currency.  Source: World Bank GEM database; IMF IFS database 
(for Hong Kong and Serbia only). 
Percent Change in External 
Reserves 
Percent change in total reserves over the period indicated in the text. 
Original data expressed in million USD. Source: World Bank GEM 
database. 
Basis Points Change in Bond 
Yields 
Absolute change in bond interest rate spreads over the period indicated in 
the text. Original data expressed in basis points over US Treasuries. 
Source: World Bank GEM database.  
Basis Points Change in 
Country Default Swaps 
Absolute change in 5 year credit default swap spread over the period 
indicated in the text. Original data expressed in daily basis points, with 
monthly averages taken.  Source: Bloomberg.  
Capital Market Pressure 
Index I 
           
                           
              
 
                    
         
 
 
The Capital Market Pressure Index I is calculated as the sum of the 
percentage changes for exchange rates and reserves weighted by their 
respective standard deviations.  The numerators are the percentage change 
between April 2013 and August 2013.  The denominators are the standard 
deviations of monthly data from January 2000 to August 2013. 
Capital Market Pressure 
Index II 
           
                           
              
 
                    
         
 
                       
      
 
 
The Capital Market Pressure Index II is calculated as the sum of the 
percentage changes for exchange rates, reserves, and stock market indices 
weighted by their respective standard deviations.  The numerators are the 
percentage change between April 2013 and August 2013.  The 
denominators are the standard deviations of monthly data from January 
2000 to August 2013.  
Increase in Current Account Current account deficit measured as percent of GDP. Calculated as the 
19 
 
Deficit average annual change in 2010–2012 over the values in 2007–2009. 
Source: IMF WEO database. 
Average Annual Percent 
Change in Real Exchange 
Rate 
Real exchange rate is calculated as the nominal exchange rate (local 
currency to USD, period average) times the inflation index (2005=100) 
for the US divided by the inflation index for each country. We calculate 
year over year percentage change in RER and then average the values 
over 2010–2012.  Source: IMF IFS database. 
Financial Market Size Logarithm of total emerging market private external finance flows (bond, 
equities, and loans) between 2010 and 2012. Source: IMF Global 
Financial Stability Report. 
Market Size Logarithm of real GDP levels for 2012.  Source: World Bank WDI. 
Stock Market Capitalization Logarithm of stock market capitalization of listed companies in current 
USD for 2012.  Source: World Bank WDI. 
Portfolio Liability Stock Logarithm of the sum portfolio liability stocks for equity and debt, 
millions of current USD for 2011. Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007. 
Reserves/M2 Ratio of total reserves to money and quasi-money (M2) for 2012.  Source: 
World Bank WDI database. 
Real GDP growth Percent change of real GDP between 2011 and 2012. Source: IMF IFS 
database. 
General Public Debt General public (government) debt as a percentage of GDP for 2012. 
Source: IMF WEO database. 
Fiscal Deficit General government fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP for 2012. 
Source: IMF WEO database. 
Inflation Inflation based on percent change in average consumer prices for 2012. 
Source: IMF WEO database. 
Capital Account Openness 
Index 
Otherwise known as the Chinn-Ito index, this measures capital account 
openness using four components: the presence of multiple exchange rates, 
restrictions on current account transactions, restrictions on capital account 
transactions, and requirements on the surrender of export proceeds. 
Source: Chinn and Ito, 2008. 
Capital Account Control 
Index 
Index created using information on restrictions on capital account 
transactions for 2012, where a value of 0 implies a completely open 
capital account and a value of 100 implies a completely closed capital 
account.  Source: IMF AREAER database. 
Increase in Capital Controls Absolute change of capital control index between 2010 and 2012. Source: 
IMF AREAER database. 
Exchange Rate Regime De facto exchange rate regime for 2012, classified into 10 categories.  
Source: IMF AREAER database.  
Doing Business Ease of Doing Business Ranking of governments for 2012.  Source:  
Doing Business database. 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicator 
Average of six governance indicators in Worldwide Governance 
Indicators database for 2012. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
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Appendix C: Size of the Market 
We consider several different measures of the size of the financial market. Incidentally, these are 
highly correlated with each other and give similar results in the regressions, as seen in Table A 1 
below.   
Table A1: Correlation between Different Measures of Size of the Market  
 Stock Market 
Capitalization, 
2012 
Portfolio 
Liability 
Stock, 2011 
Total inflow of 
bonds, equity, 
loans, 2010–2012 
GDP, 2012 
Number of observations  47 47 45 51 
Capitalization  1    
Portfolio Liability Stock 0.81 1   
Average inflow of bonds, 
equity, loans 
0.90 0.89 1  
GDP 0.90 0.80 0.92 1 
Note: Stock Market Capitalization and GDP data is from WDI; Portfolio Liability stock from Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti; Inflows of bonds, equity and loans, are total for 2010–2012, from IMF GFSR. All variables are log 
transformations.  
Figure A1: External Private Inflows (total, 2010–2012, log) and Exchange Rate 
Depreciation during April-August 2013 
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Figure A2: Stock of Portfolio Liabilities and Exchange Rate Depreciation during April-
August 2013 
 
 
Figure A3: Stock Market Capitalization and Exchange Rate Depreciation during April-
August 2013 
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Appendix D: Capital Controls 
Since the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness is available only until 2011 as of 
December 2013, we constructed another capital control variable using the information directly 
from the IMF AREAER database, which has raw data until 2012. While the Chinn-Ito index 
combined data for a wider set of categories,
15
 we concentrated just on capital account 
transactions in constructing this variable.  AREAER has entries for 62 categories covering 
restrictions on capital flows and it tabulates the data as a binary indicator—yes implying that 
there are some restrictions on capital flows within the category and no implying that there are no 
restrictions. We code these such that if a category has a restriction we gave it a value 1 and if the 
category has no restriction we gave it a value 0; we then added up all these values and scaled it to 
0–100, to come up with the overall capital account controls measure—a larger value implies less 
open capital account and more controls. We correlate the values of this index for 2011 with the 
2011 Chinn-Ito index data, and the correlation is about 0.83.  
We use this measure in a number of different ways: its level in 2012; its absolute change 
between 2009 and 2012, with changes over shorter periods—2010–2012 and 2011–2012; and its 
percent change between 2009–2012. Figure A4 below shows that the exchange rate depreciation 
is not correlated with the level of capital account openness in 2012. Figure A5 shows that an 
increase in capital account controls is correlated with a larger effect on exchange rate.   
Figure A4: Controls on Capital Flows in 2012 and Exchange Rate Depreciation during 
April-August 2013 
 
                                                          
15
 These are the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account transactions, restrictions on 
capital account transactions, and requirements on the surrender of export proceeds. 
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Figure A5: Increase in Capital Controls 2009 to 2012 and Exchange Rate Depreciation 
during April-August 2013 
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FigureA6:  Effect on Exchange Rate during April-July, 2013, Factors that Mattered 
A: Real Exchange Rate Appreciation B: Size of the Financial Markets 
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Figure A7:  Effect on Exchange Rate during April-July, 2013, Factors that did not Matter 
A: Growth B: Fiscal Deficit 
  
C: Public debt D: Foreign Reserves 
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